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Abstract
Data-flow reactive systems (DFRSs) are a class of embedded systems whose inputs and outputs are always
available as signals. Input signals can be seen as data provided by sensors, whereas the output data are
provided to system actuators. In previous works, verifying properties of DFRS models was accomplished in
a programmatic way, with no formal guarantees, and test cases were generated by translating theses models
into other notations. Here, we use Coq as a single framework to specify and verify DFRS models. Moreover,
the specification of DFRSs in Coq is automatically derived from controlled natural-language requirements.
Property verification is defined in both logical and functional terms. The latter allows for easier proof
construction. Tests are generated with the support of the QuickChick tool. Considering examples from
the literature, but also from the aerospace industry (Embraer), our testing strategy was evaluated in terms
of performance and the ability to detect defects generated by mutation; within 8 seconds, we achieved an
average mutation score of 75.80%.
Keywords: data-flow reactive systems, interactive theorem proving, Coq, property-based testing,
QuickChick, controlled natural language
1. Introduction
Over the years, we have been building a society that is highly dependent on software. In many situations,
the software is part of a safety-critical system, and all sorts of failures shall be minimised, since they might
be life-threating or impose significant financial losses. Therefore, high trustworthiness levels are typically
required for such systems.
Modelling and formal verification are strategies employed to increase system reliability. Creating models
promotes a better comprehension and a more precise description of the expected behaviour. Formal veri-
fication brings certainty about properties being preserved. For instance, considering the avionics industry,
in [1], three cases studies are reported illustrating the use of different classes of formal methods (theorem
proving, model checking, and abstract interpretation) to meet reliability levels defined by the standard DO-
178C (Software Considerations in Airbone Systems and Equipment Certification). When formal verification
is not possible or feasible, testing becomes essential since it can unveil scenarios where implementations do
not work as expected.
1.1. Model-based testing
In a model-based testing (MBT) strategy, test cases are derived from models, making the testing process
more agile, less susceptible to errors, and less dependent on human interaction. This goal is usually reached
by means of automatic generation (and execution) of test cases, besides automatic generation of test data,
from specification models.
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Here, we focus on models of data-flow reactive systems (DFRS): a class of embedded systems whose inputs
and outputs are always available as signals. Additionally, the system behaviour might be time dependent.
Models of DFRSs are fully explained in [2]. They have been used to model examples both from the literature
and the industry. In this previous work, we also show that these models can be seen as timed input-output
transition systems, but, being more abstract, enable automatic extraction from system-level specifications
in a controlled natural language, which is an important aspect as discussed in what follows.
Despite the benefits of MBT, those who are not familiar with the models syntax and semantics may
be reluctant to adopt theses formalisms. This is particularly more evident when considering formal MBT
strategies, when formal models of the system expected behaviour need to be developed. Moreover, most of
these models are not available in the very beginning of the project, when usually natural-language require-
ments are available. One possible alternative to overcome these limitations is to employ NLP techniques to
derive the required models from natural-language specifications automatically.
1.2. Natural-language processing
The demand of stating the desired system behaviour using formal models may sometimes be an obstacle
for adopting formal MBT techniques, despite all its benefits. The model notations may be not easy to
interpret by, for instance, aerospace and automotive development engineers. Hence, a specialist (usually
mathematicians, logicians, computer engineers and scientists) is required when such languages, and their
corresponding techniques, are used in business contexts. Furthermore, most of these models are not yet
available in the very beginning of the system development project.
As previously said, one possible alternative to overcome these limitations is to provide means for deriving
specification models automatically from the already existing documentation, in particular, natural-language
requirements. In this sense, NLP techniques can be helpful. If formal models are derived from natural-
language requirements, besides applying MBT techniques, one can reason formally about properties of
specifications that can be difficult to analyse by means of manual inspection, such as inconsistency and
incompleteness.
Typically, there is a trade-off concerning the application of NLP in MBT. Some studies are able to analyse
a broad range of sentences, whereas others rely on controlled versions of natural language (CNL). The works
that adopt the former approach usually depend on a higher level of user intervention to derive models and to
generate test cases. Differently, the restrictions imposed by a CNL might allow a more automatic approach
when generating models and test cases. Ideally, a compromise between these two possibilities should be
sought to provide a useful degree of automation along with a natural-language specification feasible to be
used in practice.
In this work, seeking for automation, we adopt a CNL for describing the system requirements. In [2], we
provide a comprehensive explanation of how models of DFRSs can be automatically derived from SysReq-
CNL, a CNL specially designed for editing requirements of data-flow reactive systems.
1.3. The NAT2TESTCoq strategy
Considering a characterisation of DFRSs in the Coq proof assistant [3], we expand here the limits of the
NAT2TEST strategy [4], which is devised to generate test cases from natural-language requirements. The
specialisations of this strategy allow for exploring the benefits of different formal techniques, such as SMT
solving, model and refinement checking, and simulation.
The specialisation proposed in this paper (hereafter, named NAT2TESTCoq) is the first one based on
an interactive proof assistant (Coq), which also brings new benefits and possibilities. For instance, in our
previous efforts, verification of consistency properties of DFRS models was accomplished in a programmatic
way, decoupled from the formal consistency definition. Here, we use the Coq proof assistant as a single
framework to both specify and verify properties of DFRS models. Property verification is defined in both
logical and functional terms. The latter allows for easier proof construction, besides contributing to the
development of correct-by-construction tools (via extraction of Haskell/Ocaml code from the functional
definitions), which is currently a future work.
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Figure 1: NAT2TEST – a strategy for generating test cases based on different formalisms
Furthermore, tests are generated via the QuickChick tool [5]. Considering examples from the literature,
but also from the aerospace industry (Embraer1), our testing strategy was evaluated in terms of performance
and the ability to detect defects generated by mutation; within 8 seconds, we achieved an average mutation
score of 75.80%.
Therefore, the main contribution of this work is a single and consistent framework, based on Coq, for
modelling, verifying and testing timed reactive systems from natural-language requirements; besides pro-
viding empirical evidence on the quality of our test generation strategy via mutant-based strength analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the main concepts related to this
work (the NAT2TEST strategy, data-flow reactive systems, interactive theorem proving, and property-based
testing). Sections 3 and 4 present our logical and functional characterisation of symbolic and expanded data-
flow reactive systems, respectively. Section 5 addresses test generation, based on the QuickChick tool. Our
empirical analyses are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper by discussing related
and future work.
2. Background
Now, we present the foundational concepts related to this work: the NAT2TEST strategy (Section 2.1),
DFRS models (Section 2.2), Coq (Section 2.3), and property-based testing (Section 2.4).
2.1. The NAT2TEST strategy
The NAT2TEST strategy is tailored to generate tests for timed data-flow reactive systems, considering
different internal and hidden formalisms (see Figure 1). This test-generation strategy comprises a number
of phases. The three initial phases are fixed: (1) syntactic analysis, (2) semantic analysis, and (3) DFRS
generation; the remaining phases depend on the internal formalism chosen.
1Embraer website: https://embraer.com/global/en
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Syntactic analysis. In this work, requirements are written according to a CNL based on English: the
SysReq-CNL, specially designed for editing requirements of data-flow reactive systems. The first phase of
the NAT2TEST strategy is responsible for verifying whether the requirements are in accordance with the
SysReq-CNL grammar. For each valid requirement, its corresponding syntax tree is identified.
As a running example, we consider a Vending Machine (VM) (adapted from the coffee machine presented
in [6]). Initially, the VM is in an idle state. When it receives a coin, it goes to the choice state. After
inserting a coin, when the coffee option is selected, the system goes to the weak or strong coffee state.
If coffee is selected within 30 seconds after inserting the coin, the system goes to the weak coffee state.
Otherwise, it goes to the strong coffee state. The time required to produce a weak coffee is also different
from that of a strong coffee; the former is produced within 10 to 30 seconds, whereas the latter within 30
to 50 seconds. After producing coffee, the system returns to the idle state.
The following sentence exemplifies a requirement (REQ001) that adheres to the SysReq-CNL grammar:
When the system mode is idle, and the coin sensor changes to true, the coffee machine system shall: reset
the request timer, assign choice to the system mode.
Semantic analysis. In the second phase, the requirements are semantically analysed using the case grammar
theory [7]. In this theory, a sentence is not analysed in terms of the syntactic categories or grammatical
functions, but in terms of the semantic (thematic) roles played by each word/group of words in the sentence.
Therefore, for each syntax tree, the group of words that correspond to a thematic role is identified. The
collection of thematic roles for a requirement is called a requirement frame.
Table 1 shows the requirement frame for REQ001. We note that the thematic roles are grouped into
conditions and actions. The roles that appear in actions are the following: Action – the action performed if
the conditions are satisfied; Agent – entity who performs the action; Patient – entity who is affected by the
action; and To Value – the patient value after action completion. Similar roles appear in conditions.
Table 1: Example of requirement frame for REQ001 (VM)
Condition #1 - Main Verb (Condition Action): is
Condition Patient: the system mode Condition From Value: –
Condition Modifier: – Condition To Value: idle
Condition #2 - Main Verb (Condition Action): changes
Condition Patient: the coin sensor Condition From Value: –
Condition Modifier: – Condition To Value: true
Action - Main Verb (Action): reset
Agent: the coffee machine system To Value: –
Patient: the request timer
Action – Main Verb (Action): assign
Agent: the coffee machine system To Value: choice
Patient: the system mode
DFRS generation. Afterwards, the third phase derives DFRS models – an intermediate formal characterisa-
tion of the system behaviour from which other formal notations can be derived. The possibility of exploring
different formal notations allows analyses from several perspectives, using different languages, tools, and
techniques. Besides that, it makes our strategy extensible. Models of DFRSs are explained in the following
section. For a comprehensive explanation of how DFRS models are derived from requirement frames, we
refer to [2].
Test generation. Test generation is achieved by translating DFRS models into internal and hidden for-
malisms. In what follows, we list the possibilities currently supported by the NAT2TEST strategy.
• NAT2TESTSCR: based on Software Cost Reduction – SCR [8] (more details in [9])
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• NAT2TESTIMR: based on Internal Model Representation – IMR [10] (more details in [11])
• NAT2TESTCSP : based on Communicating Sequential Processes – CSP [12] (more details in [13])
• NAT2TESTCPN : based on Coloured Petri Nets – CPN [14] (more details in [15])
• NAT2TESTCoq : based on Coq [3] – the main contribution of this paper
As said before, exploring different formal notations allows test generation from several perspectives, using
different languages, tools, and techniques. The strategies NAT2TESTSCR and NAT2TESTIMR generate
test cases with the support of commercial testing tools: T-VEC2 and RT-Tester3, respectively. Differently,
the NAT2TESTCSP strategy reuses a general purpose refinement checker (FDR
4) and SMT solver (Z35)
to deliver a formal and sound testing theory. Scalability is a known issue of this specialisation of the
NAT2TEST strategy. Differently, the NAT2TESTCPN strategy aims at efficiency by generating test cases
via random simulation of CPN models. Table 2 summarises the languages, tools and techniques considered
by the aforementioned specialisations in order to generate test cases.
Table 2: Specialisations of the NAT2TEST strategy – techniques for generating test cases
Internal formalism Applied techniques Tools integration
NAT2TESTSCR SCR SMT solving T-VEC
NAT2TESTIMR IMR SMT solving RT-Tester
NAT2TESTCSP CSPM Model checking + SMT solving FDR + Z3
NAT2TESTCPN CPN Simulation CPN Tools
NAT2TESTCoq Coq Property-based testing Coq + QuickChick
The NAT2TESTCoq strategy distinguishes itself by integrating the NAT2TEST strategy with a technique
not explored so far (proof assistants), and generating test cases via property-based testing. Now, besides
test generation, it is also possible to develop proof scripts in Coq for proving relevant properties.
Other extensions. In [16], we extend our CNL to allow the specification of environment restrictions and,
thus, how the system interacts with its surrounding environment. This extension has only been incorporated
into the NAT2TESTCSP specialisation. In this way, unrealistic interactions between the system and the
environment are not considered when generating test cases via FDR + Z3.
In [17], we allow the specification in natural language of system properties (in the style of temporal logic).
These properties, along with the system requirements, are translated into CTL formulae and NuSMV models,
respectively. With the aid of the NuSMV model checker [18], it is possible to assess whether the specified
properties are satisfied by the NuSMV models. Here, test generation is not the ultimate goal, but model
checking requirements.
Finally, in [19], we discuss a vertical adaptation of the NAT2TEST strategy in order to simulate hybrid
systems (featuring the integration of discrete and continuous behavioural aspects) also from requirements
adhering to a CNL. Therefore, in this work we revisit each phase of the NAT2TEST strategy, now considering
the h-SysReq-CNL (an extension of the SysReq-CNL where it is possible to define differential equations)
and a hybrid version of DFRS models (h-DFRS). Simulation is enabled by translating h-DFRS models into
Acumen [20], which is a language and tool for the specification and simulation of hybrid systems.
2T-VEC website: https://www.t-vec.com/
3RT-Tester website: https://www.verified.de/products/rt-tester/
4FDR website: https://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/projects/fdr/
5Z3 website: https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3
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2.2. Data-flow reactive systems
A data-flow reactive system (DFRS) is an embedded system whose inputs and outputs are always avail-
able, as signals. The input signals can be seen as data provided by sensors, whereas the outputs are data
provided to actuators. A DFRS can also have internal timers, which are used to trigger time-based be-
haviour. There are two models of DFRSs: a symbolic (s-DFRS) and an expanded (e-DFRS) one. Briefly
speaking, the former comprises an initial state, along with functions that describe the system behaviour (how
the system state might evolve). Differently, an e-DFRS represents the system behaviour as a state-based
machine; it can be seen as an expansion of its symbolic counterpart by applying the s-DFRS functions to
its initial state, but also to the new reachable states.
As a running example, we consider the VM (presented previously). In this example, we have two input
signals related to the coin sensor (sensor) and the coffee request button (request). A true value means that
a coin was inserted or that the coffee request button was pressed, respectively. There are two output signals:
one related to the system mode (mode) and another to the vending machine output (output). The values
communicated by these signals reflect the system’s possible modes (choice 7→ 0, idle 7→ 1, strong coffee 7→ 2,
and weak coffee 7→ 3) and the possible outputs (strong 7→ 0, and weak 7→ 1). The VM has just one timer:
the request timer, which is used to register the moments when a coin is inserted, when the coffee request
button is pressed, and when the coffee is produced.
Figure 2 illustrates a scenario assuming continuous observation of the input and output signals. If we
had chosen to observe the system discretely, we would have a similar scenario, but with a discrete number
of samples over time.
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Figure 2: Example of signals for the vending machine
In this scenario, a coin is inserted 2s after starting the machine, and a coffee request is performed 10s
later. The first input drives the system to the choice mode, whereas the second one to the weak coffee mode.
A weak coffee is produced 14s after the request, which is reflected by changing the machine output signal.
An s-DFRS is a 6-tuple: (I, O, T, gcvar, s0, F ). Inputs (I ) and outputs (O) are system variables, whereas
timers (T ) are used to model temporal behaviour. The global clock is gcvar, a variable whose values are
non-negative numbers. The initial state is s0, and F is a set of functions describing the system behaviour.
An e-DFRS differs from the symbolic one as it encodes the system behaviour as a state-based machine,
whereas an s-DFRS does that symbolically via definitions of functions. An e-DFRS represents a timed
system with continuous or discrete behaviour modelled as a state-based machine. States are obtained from
an s-DFRS by applying its functions to non-stable states (when a system reaction is expected), but also
letting the time evolve. Therefore, an e-DFRS is a 7-tuple: (I, O, T, gcvar, s0, S, TR), where TR is a
transition relation associating states in S by means of delay and function transitions. A delay transition
represents the observation of the input signals’ values after a given delay, whereas the function transition
represents how the system reacts to the input signals: the observed values of the output signals. The
transitions are encoded as assignments to input and output variables as well as timers.
Considering the example presented in Figure. 2, Figure. 3 shows some states of the e-DFRS representation
for the vending machine. The initial state considers the initial value of all system variables. The delay
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transition represents the change of the sensor signal from false to true after elapsing 2 seconds. Note that
the value of sensor and the system global clock (gc) is updated in the state reached by the delay transition.
At this moment, a system reaction is expected, which is characterised by a function transition, updating the
system mode, besides resetting the request timer. Here, the reset operation is represented as assigning to
the timer the current system global clock. The underlying reason is later explained. The function transition
happens instantaneously (time does not evolve).
sensor = false
button = false
mode = 1
output = 0
timer = 0
gc = 0
sensor = true
button = false
mode = 1
output = 0
timer = 0
gc = 2
sensor = true
button = false
mode = 0
output = 0
timer = 2
gc = 2
Delay transition (2s)
sensor := true
button := false
Function transition
mode := 0
timer := 2
Figure 3: Some states of the e-DFRS representation for the vending machine
As said before, we refer to [2] for a comprehensive explanation of DFRS models, besides showing how
they can be derived from natural-language requirements.
2.3. The Coq proof assistant
Opposed to automatic theorem provers, which aim to develop proofs in a full automatic manner, interac-
tive theorem provers (also known as proof assistants) are tools that mix human interaction and some degree
of automation when building proofs. Here, we present Coq [3], which is used later in this work.
Coq employs a functional language (Gallina), which is similar to Haskell, to describe algorithms. Computer-
verified proofs are developed interactively using tactics, which have some limited support for automation
via the tactics language (Ltac). As a logic system, Coq considers a higher-order logic. In what follows, we
briefly address these three topics (Gallina, tactics, and automation). Moreover, we also explain the benefits
and limitations of functional, logic, and inductive definitions in Coq.
2.3.1. The Gallina language
Gallina is a typical functional language, with support to define new types, besides polymorphic and
higher-order functions. When defining a non-recursive function, one should use the keyword Definition. See
the following example (is empty) of a polymorphic function (valid for any given type T ) that yields a logic
value (True or False) indicating whether the given list is empty.
Definition is empty {T : Type} (l : list T ) : Prop :=
match l with
| [] ⇒ True
| ⇒ False
end.
Recursive functions shall use Fixpoint. The following example (length) yields the number of elements of
a given list l. By pattern matching, if l is empty, the function yields 0. Otherwise, it yields the length of
the list tail (tl) plus 1.
Fixpoint length {T : Type} (l : list T ) : nat :=
match l with
| [] ⇒ 0
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| h :: tl ⇒ 1 + length tl
end.
Differently from other functional languages, in Coq, all functions must terminate on all inputs. To
ensure that, each recursion must structurally decrease some (the same) argument. If the decreasing analysis
performed by the tool cannot identify such an argument, the corresponding recursive function is not defined.
In the previous example (length), the decreasing argument is the list itself; each recursive call is performed
on a smaller list.
2.3.2. Building proofs with tactics
In Coq, proofs are developed with the aid of tactics6. In the following example, we prove that the length
of a list obtained by an append is equal to the sum of the lengths of the appended lists. Let app be the
appending function, the theorem length app formalises the previous statement.
Theorem length app :
∀ (T : Type) (l1 l2 : list T ), length (app l1 l2 ) = length l1 + length l2.
Proof.
intros. induction l1.
- simpl. reflexivity.
- simpl. rewrite IHl1. reflexivity.
Qed.
The tactics employed modifies the proof goal in order to demonstrate its truth. Table 3 shows how the
proof goal evolves after processing each tactic. The command Proof. starts the proof environment, loading
the proof goal. After that, intros. performs universal instantiation, in order to prove the goal for arbitrary
values of T, l1, and l2. The command induction l1. performs induction on l1. This creates two subgoals:
base case, and inductive step. The symbol - (optional) tells Coq that we now focus on the next subgoal
(base case).
After simplifying the proof goal of the base case (simpl.), we are left to prove that length l2 = length
l2, which is trivially true (proved by reflexivity.). In the inductive step, assuming the hypothesis IHl1 :
length (app l1 l2) = length l1 + length l2, we need to prove that length (app (a :: l1) l2) =
length (a :: l1) + length l2 holds. After simplification (simpl.), the goal becomes: S (length (app
l1 l2)) = S (length l1 + length l2).
By rewriting the goal considering IHl1 (rewrite IHl1.) we get S (length l1 + length l2) = S
(length l1 + length l2), provable by reflexivity.. The command Qed. finishes the prove. Each
command is verified by Coq, and it can only be applied if the underlying premises for its application are
satisfied. This ensures the construction of a computer-verifiable proof.
2.3.3. Proof automation
Support for proof automation comes as tacticals (higher-order tactics – i.e., tactics that take other tactics
as arguments), user-defined tactics, and some decision procedures. To illustrate some of these, consider the
proof that a list is empty if, and only if, its length is 0.
6Index of built-in tactics: https://coq.inria.fr/refman/coq-tacindex.html
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Table 3: Proof of theorem length app
Command Proof state
Proof. forall (T : Type) (l1 l2 : list T),
length (app l1 l2) = length l1 + length l2
intros. length (app l1 l2) = length l1 + length l2
induction l1. (1/2)
length (app [] l2) = length [] + length l2
(2/2)
length (app (a :: l1) l2) = length (a :: l1) +
length l2
- length (app [] l2) = length [] + length l2
simpl. length l2 = length l2
reflexivity. This subproof is complete
- IHl1 : length (app l1 l2) = length l1 + length l2
length (app (a :: l1) l2) = length (a :: l1) +
length l2
simpl. IHl1 : length (app l1 l2) = length l1 + length l2
S (length (app l1 l2)) = S (length l1 + length l2)
rewrite IHl1. IHl1 : length (app l1 l2) = length l1 + length l2
S (length l1 + length l2) = S (length l1 + length
l2)
reflexivity. No more subgoals.
Qed. length app is defined
Theorem empty length 0 :
∀ (T : Type) (l : list T ),
is empty l ↔ length l = 0.
Proof.
intros. destruct l.
- split.
+ simpl. intro H. reflexivity.
+ simpl. intro H. reflexivity.
- split.
+ simpl. intro H. inversion H.
+ simpl. intro H. inversion H.
Qed.
Ltac trivial hypo :=
try (simpl ; intro H ; reflexivity).
Ltac absurd hypo :=
try (simpl ; intro H ; inversion H ).
Theorem empty length 0’ :
∀ (T : Type) (l : list T ),
is empty l ↔ length l = 0.
Proof.
intros. destruct l ; split ;
repeat (trivial hypo ; absurd hypo).
Qed.
In our first try (empty length 0 ), we perform a case analysis on l (i.e., empty and non-empty list). Since
the goal involves an equivalence (↔), we use the tactic split. to generate two subgoals considering both
sides of the implication. The first two cases (when the list is empty) can be trivially proved by reflexivity.
The two others (when the list is not empty) are proved by contradiction (inversion H), since we have a
contradictory hypothesis H in the proof context: a non-empty list is empty, or the length of a non-empty
list is 0. As one can see, there is some degree of repetition, and thus room for automation, in this proof.
In our second try (empty length 0’ ), we define two tactics (trivial hypo, and absurd hypo), which tries
to prove the current goal by reflexivity or contradiction, respectively. Then, the theorem is proved by trying
to apply these two tactics many times (repeat). The command ; applies the following commands to all
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subgoals, and not only to the next one.
2.3.4. Functional, logical, and inductive characterisations
Another important aspect of Coq to this work is the possibility to define aspects functionally, logically,
or inductively. To give a concrete example, consider the following definitions of whether a number is even.
The first definition (evenb) is a function that yields true (boolean value) if n is even, false otherwise. In
this definition, S denotes the successor of a natural number. If n is the successor of the successor of some
number n’, to assess whether n is even it suffices to assess whether n’ is even.
Fixpoint evenb (n : nat) : bool :=
match n with
| 0 ⇒ true
| 1 ⇒ false
| S (S n’ ) ⇒ evenb n’
end.
Definition is even (n : nat) : Prop :=
∃ k, n = k + k.
Inductive even : nat → Prop :=
| ev 0 : even 0
| ev SS : ∀ n, even n → even (S (S n)).
The second definition (is even) defines this concept in logical terms: a natural number n is even if, and
only if, there is a natural number k, such that n = k + k . The third, and last, definition (even) characterises
this concept inductively. The definitions ev 0 and ev SS can be seen as inference rules, stating that 0 is
even (ev 0 ), and that if n is even, the successor of its successor is also even (ev SS ).
Although these three definitions properly capture the concept of being even, proving facts using these
definitions might differ significantly. For the last two definitions (logical and inductive ones), one will need
to use specific tactics to deal with the existential quantifier and the inference rules, respectively. Differently,
concerning the functional definition, one can use the tactic simpl. to simplify the proof goal by evaluating
the function evenb for the given arguments. However, in some situations, due to the termination requirement
of Coq for functions, one cannot rely on a purely functional definition.
In this work, when dealing with concrete examples of DFRSs, we favor their functional characterisation
to enable automatic proof of model consistency.
2.4. Property-based testing
Testing is an extremely important task for software development, also complimentary to proofs. Even
in the presence of proved components, we typically need to integrate them to unproved ones, and thus we
need to rely on testing to analyse integration. Additionally, testing can be used as a quick tool to evaluate
properties, before trying to prove them. If we submit a property to a large and relevant number of test
cases, and it does not fail, we get confidence on its correctness. If it fails, we save proof effort on trying to
prove False.
Property-based testing, famous in the functional world due to the QuickCheck framework for Haskell [21],
consists of random generation of input data in order to test a computable (executable) property. It comprises
four ingredients: (i) an executable property P , (ii) generators of random input values for P , (iii), printers
for reporting counterexamples, and (iv) shrinkers to minimise counterexamples.
A simple example shown in the QuickCheck manual7 describes how to test whether the reverse of the
reverse of a list is equal to the original list. First, one needs to define this property in Haskell:
prop RevRev xs = reverse (reverse xs) == xs
where types = xs::[Int]
Then, QuickCheck is called to try to falsify the property. In this case, no counterexample is found, which
is expected, since the property is actually true. However, if testing whether the reverse of a list is equal to
the original list, a counterexample should be easily found, and presented to the user.
The concept of property-based testing is supported in Coq via the QuickChick tool, which is an adaptation
of QuickCheck ideas for the Coq proof assistant. In this work, we use the QuickChick tool for generating
test cases for DFRSs.
7QuickCheck: http://www.cse.chalmers.se/~rjmh/QuickCheck/manual.html
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Figure 4: Characterisation of DFRSs in Coq
3. Characterisation of symbolic DFRSs in Coq
For a comprehensive explanation of DFRSs (using Z), a discussion of their expressiveness, along with
theoretical and practical validations, besides an explanation of how such models can be automatically derived
from controlled natural-language requirements, we refer to [2]. Here, we highlight some aspects of our
Coq representation, which main benefit is to have a single computer-verifiable framework for specification,
verification and testing. It also enables the extraction of functional code (Haskell/Ocaml) directly from the
verified and formal functional definitions; contributing to the development of correct-by-construction tools.
The general architecture of our characterisation of DFRSs in Coq8 is presented in Figure 4. The folders
variables, states, and functions define the constituent elements of a symbolic DFRS (s dfrs). The folder
e dfrs contains the definitions of an expanded DFRS, which is built upon the symbolic one and the definition
of a transition relation (trans rel). Each folder has a main *.v file (named after the folder’s name), which
provides a logical characterisation. There are two other files: * fun rules.v (a functional characterisation),
and * fun ind equiv.v (proving that both characterisations are equivalent – not shown in Figure 4 to save
space). These proofs allow us to create instances of DFRSs, proving automatically that they are consistent.
This aspect is further explained later.
In s2e dfrs, we have functions that allow for a dynamic expansion of an e DFRS from a given s DFRS.
Part of these functions are used by our test generation module (defined in quickchick). Finally, the examples
considered in this paper are defined in examples. One might rely on the quickchick module to generate test
cases or on the s2e dfrs module to perform bounded expansion of an e DFRS. In what follows, we detail
our Coq characterisation of DFRSs.
3.1. Logical characterisation of symbolic DFRSs
As said before, an s DFRS is a 6-tuple: (I, O, T, gcvar, s0, F ), comprising (input, output, and timer)
variables, besides a global clock, along with an initial state, and a set of functions describing the system
behaviour.
8Available online in: https://github.com/igormeira/DFRScoq
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3.1.1. Variables
System variables (SVARS ), which might represent input or output variables, are defined as a list of pairs
of names and types (TYPE ). A variable name (VNAME ) is basically a string (NAME is defined as a string)
that cannot be the reserved name of the system global clock, which is “gc”.
Definition ind rules svars (svars :
list (VNAME × TYPE )) : Prop :=
is function (map (fun p ⇒ fst p)
svars) comp vname
∧ ¬ (length svars = 0)
∧ ind svars valid type svars.
Record VNAME : Set := mkVNAME {
vname : NAME
; rules vname : ind rules vname vname
}.
Record SVARS : Set := mkSVARS {
svars : list (VNAME × TYPE )
; rules svars : ind rules svars svars
}.
It is important to note the usage of Record. In Coq, differently from typical programming languages,
a record might comprise data values (vnames and svars), but also properties (predicates) that need to
hold (rules vname and rules svars). Therefore, when creating an instance of a record, it is necessary to
prove that the corresponding properties hold. This feature brings cohesion between structural definition
and consistency properties.
For the VNAME record, the property rules vname enforces that the variable name (vname) is different
from “gc”. Concerning SVARS, we have that svars needs to be a non-empty function of variable names to
types (no name repetition, and each name is mapped to a single type). Besides that, we need to have type
consistency. These properties are defined with the aid of propositional functions (i.e., functions that build
predicates from the given arguments): ind rules vname (not shown here), and ind rules svars. A record
instance is created as follows.
Definition the coin sensor : VNAME.
Proof.
apply (mkVNAME “the coin sensor”).
unfold ind rules vname, gc, not. intro H. inversion H.
Defined.
First, we give a name for the instance (the coin sensor), and then Coq enters on proof mode. After
providing the value for the instance (“the coin sensor”) via the command apply (mkVNAME ...)., we need
to prove that the defined properties hold for the given value; in this case, that “the coin sensor” is not equal
to “gc”. By unfolding the definitions of ind rules vname, gc and not we are left to prove that string dec
“the coin sensor” “gc” → False. In Coq, the logical negation (¬ P) is modelled as P → False. Then, we
move the antecedent of the implication to the proof context (intro H.), and finish the proof since H is a
contradiction (inversion H.). This feature (records with values and predicates) prevents us from creating
inconsistent instances (violating rules).
It is worth noting that the proof is finished with Defined. instead of Qed.. This makes the definition
transparent, and it can be unfolded later (we will be able to retrieve the string associated with vname).
When a proof is finished with Qed., it is marked as opaque (proof irrelevance). To model system timers, we
define a different record STIMERS. DFRS variables are defined as follows:
Record DFRS VARIABLES : Set := mkDFRS VARIABLES {
I : SVARS ; O : SVARS ; T : STIMERS ; gcvar : NAME × TYPE
; rules dfrs variables : ind rules dfrs variables I O T gcvar
}.
The definition of ind rules dfrs variables guarantees that: (i) the name of the gc variable is the string
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“gc”, (ii) I, O, and T are disjoint (different names), and (iv) we have type consistency between timers and
the global clock (they share the same type). For the vending machine, we have the following definitions.
Definition vm I : SVARS. Proof.
apply (mkSVARS [(the coin sensor, Tbool) ; (the coffee request button, Tbool)]).
(* proof omitted *) Defined.
Definition vm variables : DFRS VARIABLES. Proof.
apply (mkDFRS VARIABLES vm I vm O vm T vm gcvar). (* proof omitted *)
Defined.
The element vm I defines the input variables; vm O, vm T, and vm gcvar are analogous. Note that
the element the coin sensor was defined in a previous example.
3.1.2. Initial state
A state is a list of names mapped to a pair of values. See the following definitions.
Record STATE : Set := mkSTATE {
state : list (NAME × (VALUE × VALUE ))
; rules state : ind rules state state }.
Record DFRS INITIAL STATE : Set :=
mkDFRS INITIAL STATE { s0 : STATE }.
The pair elements are the previous/current variable values. The property ind rules state enforces that
state is also a function. The initial state for the VM is: both input signals are false, the system mode is idle
(i 1 ), the machine output is strong coffee (i 0 ), and the timer and the global clock are equal to 0.
Definition vm state : STATE.
Proof. apply (mkSTATE
[(“the coin sensor”, (b false, b false));
(“the coffee request button”, (b false, b false));
(“the system mode”, (i 1, i 1));
(“the coffee machine output”, (i 0, i 0));
(“the request timer”, (n 0, n 0)); (“gc”, (n 0, n 0))]).
(* proof omitted *)
Defined.
3.1.3. Functions
A DFRS might comprise multiple concurrent components. The behaviour of each component is described
by a function. The behaviour of the entire s DFRS is then defined as a list of functions (F ), which cannot be
empty (ensured by ind rules dfrs functions). Each function (function) is a list of 4-tuples: a static guard,
a timed guard, a list of assignments, and requirement traceability information. The first two elements define
the static and timed conditions necessary to be met to react by performing the respective assignments. One
of these two conditions can be empty, but not both (ensured by ind rules function).
Record FUNCTION : Set := mkFUNCTION {
function : list (EXP × EXP × ASGMTS × REQUIREMENT ) ;
rules function : ind rules function function }.
Record DFRS FUNCTIONS : Set := mkDFRS FUNCTIONS {
F : list FUNCTION ; rules dfrs functions : ind rules dfrs functions F }.
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The aforementioned requirement of the VM (REQ001) says that “when the system mode is idle, and the
coin sensor changes to true, the coffee machine system shall: reset the request timer, assign choice to the
system mode”. Part of the formalisation of this requirement is shown below: req001 sg disj3 models one
clause of its static guard (the current system mode is equal to idle—1), whereas req001 asgmt2 models one
of its assignments (updating the system mode to choice—0). The term DIS refers to a list of disjunctive
clauses; in this example, we have a conjunction of two elements, each one with a single disjunction. In our
work, the conditions adhere to a Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF).
Definition req001 sg disj3 : DISJ.
Proof. apply (mkDISJ [mkBEXP (current (the system mode)) eq (i 1)]).
(* proof omitted *) Defined.
Definition req001 asgmt2 : ASGMT.
Proof. apply (mkASGMT (the system mode, (i 0))). Defined.
3.1.4. s DFRSs
An s DFRS is composed by the previously defined elements. Various consistency properties are enforce
by ind rules s dfrs; for instance, the initial state must provide values for all system variables. We refer to
our git repository for the definition in details of ind rules s dfrs.
Record s DFRS : Set := mkS DFRS {
s dfrs variables : DFRS VARIABLES ;
s dfrs initial state : DFRS INITIAL STATE ;
s dfrs functions : DFRS FUNCTIONS
; rules s dfrs : ind rules s dfrs s dfrs variables s dfrs initial state s dfrs functions
}.
3.2. Functional characterisation of symbolic/expanded DFRSs
When defining the element the coin sensor, it was necessary to prove that the variable name is not “gc”.
When more complex consistency rules need to be proved, the proof script becomes equally more complex,
which inhibits automation. A workaround consists in providing functionally-defined consistency rules, which
are logically equivalent to their logical/inductive counterparts.
The equivalence proof for ind rules vname (a variable name shall be different from “gc”) is shown below.
We prove both sides of the implication (split.) by reaching (via different ways) a contradiction in the proof
(inversion H’).
Theorem theo rules vname :
∀ (vname : NAME ), ind rules vname vname ↔ fun rules vname vname = true.
Proof.
intros. unfold fun rules vname, ind rules vname. split.
- intro H. unfold not in H. apply eq true not negb. unfold not. intro H’.
rewrite theo string dec in H. apply H in H’. inversion H’.
- intro H. unfold not. intro H’. rewrite negb true iff in H.
rewrite theo string dec in H’. rewrite H in H’. inversion H’.
Qed.
Now it is possible to define the coin sensor as follows. We apply the theorem theo rules vname to
rewrite the proof goal considering the functional characterisation. Then, it suffices to execute the tactic
reflexivity., which simplifies the goal by performing the necessary computations, besides concluding the
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proof.
Definition the coin sensor : VNAME.
Proof.
apply (mkVNAME “the coin sensor”). apply theo rules vname. reflexivity.
Defined.
Actually, all proofs omitted in the previous examples follow this pattern. Nevertheless, the logical/in-
ductive characterisation is still useful, mainly when dealing with infinite aspects, which appear on expanded
DFRSs. The functional counterpart needs to be bounded to some exploration limit.
4. Characterisation of expanded DFRSs in Coq
An e DFRS is defined in terms of a transition relation (a list of transitions – TRANS ). Each transition
relates two states by means of a label (TRANS LABEL). A label denotes a function (func) or a delay (del)
transition. A function transition models system reaction; it changes the value of output variables and timers.
A delay transition models time evolving (DELAY ), besides modifying the value of system inputs. A number
of consistency rules are enforced by rules TR.
Inductive TRANS LABEL : Type :=
| func : (ASGMTS × REQUIREMENT )
→ TRANS LABEL
| del : (DELAY × ASGMTS )
→ TRANS LABEL.
Record TRANS : Set := mkTRANS {
STS : STATE × TRANS LABEL
× STATE }.
Record TRANSREL : Set :=
mkTRANSREL {
transrel : list TRANS }.
Record
DFRS TRANSITION RELATION
:= mkDFRSTRANSITIONREL {
TR : TRANSREL ;
rules TR : ind rules TR TR ; }.
An e DFRS is defined as a combination of variables, states, and a transition relation. As said before, an
e DFRS is obtained by the expansion of the corresponding s DFRS, by letting the time evolve (performing
delay transitions), and observing how the system reacts to input stimuli (performing function transitions).
Record e DFRS : Set := mkE DFRS {
e dfrs variables : DFRS VARIABLES ;
e dfrs states : DFRS STATES ;
e dfrs transition relation : DFRS TRANSITION RELATION ;
}.
Since time is always expected to be able to evolve, and the system global clock is part of the state,
an e DFRS comprises an infinite number of states. Therefore, a function that expands a symbolic DFRS,
yielding the obtained e DFRS, would never terminate its execution and, thus, cannot be defined in Coq. In
the following section, we explain how we can perform a bounded construction of an e DFRS.
4.1. Bounded construction of expanded DFRSs
Typically, an e DFRS consists of an infinite number of states, since time might always evolve, reaching
a new state (different value for the global clock). Therefore, although one can characterise all states of an
e DFRS inductively, a functional definition needs to be bounded. Here, we restrict the number of recursive
calls of buildTR, which expands dynamically an s DFRS, up to num. When it reaches 0, the function stops.
When there are still states to visit (expand), and the limit has not been reached, new states are generated
with the aid of the auxiliary function genTransitions. Then, the function recurses decreasing the limit by
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one.
Fixpoint buildTR (toVisit visited : list STATE ) (I Out T : list (VNAME × TYPE ))
(F : list (list FUNCTION )) (possibilities : list (VNAME × list VALUE ))
(num : nat) : list TRANS :=
match toVisit, num with
| [] , ⇒ []
| :: , 0 ⇒ []
| h :: t, S n’ ⇒ let tr1 := genTransitions h I Out T F possibilities
in if in state list h.(variables) visited beq state
then buildTR t visited I Out T F possibilities n’
else tr1.(transrel) ++
buildTR (t ++ (get list states tr1.(transrel) (h :: visited)))
(h :: visited) I Out T F possibilities n’
end.
The function genTransitions first assesses whether a given state is stable (no system reaction is expected,
which means that no static and timed guards evaluate to true). If it is stable, the function generates delay
transitions (with the configured time step) considering all possible combinations of input values. Otherwise,
the function generates function transitions considering the assignments associated with the static and timed
guards that evaluate to true.
Definition genTransitions (s : STATE ) (I O T : list (VNAME × TYPE ))
(F : list (list FUNCTION )) (possibilities : list (VNAME × list VALUE ))
: TRANSREL :=
let entries := union lists (map (fun f : FUNCTION ⇒ f.(function)) (union lists F )) in
let combinations := gen asgmts combination (possible asgmts possibilities) [[]] in
if is stable s (List.app I O) T F
then mkTRANSREL (make trans del s I T combinations)
else mkTRANSREL (make trans func s (I ++ O) T entries).
This bounded and functional exploration of e DFRSs can support the development of simulators for
e DFRSs. Recall that it is possible to extract Haskell and Ocaml code directly from functional definitions
in Gallina. Simulation is an important validation technique, since it enables the analysis of whether the
created model properly captures the system’s expected behaviour.
5. Generating test cases with QuickChick
Besides bounded exploration, we also allow for the generation of test data (via QuickChick) by sam-
pling valid traces. To achieve this goal, we define a function (genValidTrace) that, given an s DFRS, yields
random valid traces (a list of transitions). To generate valid sequences of transitions, this function relies
upon genTransitions, previously defined (see Section 4.1). From the initial state, it generates the possible
transitions. Then, it randomly chooses one possible transition, and calls genValidTrace recursively, consid-
ering as the current state the one reached by the selected transition. The generation of a trace stops when
size reaches 0 (similarly to num in buildTR – see Section 4.1), but also when num has not reached 0 yet.
However, this last situation happens with a lower probability. This is achieved via the operator freq.
Fixpoint genValidTrace (st : STATE ) (dfrs : s DFRS )
(possibilities : list (VNAME × list VALUE )) (size : nat) : G trace :=
match size with
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| 0 ⇒ ret []
| S size’ ⇒ let
tr := (genTransitions st dfrs.(s dfrs variables).(I ).(svars)
dfrs.(s dfrs variables).(O).(svars) dfrs.(s dfrs variables).(T ).(stimers)
[dfrs.(s dfrs functions).(F )] possibilities).(transrel)
in freq [ (1, ret []) ;
(size, x ← next label st tr ;;
xs ← genValidTrace (nextState st x tr) dfrs possibilities size’ ;; ret (x :: xs)) ]
When we sample genValidTrace with QuickChick, by default, it performs 11 calls to the function. See
the QuickChick documentation9 for more information. Table 4 shows, in a tabular form, a fragment of an
output (test data) generated via QuickChick. The labels time, sensor, request, mode, and output refer to
the system global clock, the coin sensor, the coffee request button, the system mode, and the coffee machine
output, respectively. For this example, the configured time step was 1 and, thus, we see the system global
clock evolving by 1 time unit per test step.
Table 4: Example of test data generated via QuickChick (VM)
time sensor request mode output
0 false false 1 0
1 false false 1 0
2 true true 0 0
3 true true 0 0
4 false false 0 0
In this example, a coin is inserted and the coffee request button is pressed both at the time (2 seconds
after the test beginning). As expected, the system mode changes to choice (represented as 0). When
the system global clock is 4, 2 seconds later, the coin sensor becomes false again, and the coffee request
button is released. Although not shown in this tabular representation, as we keep requirement traceability
information, when defining functions (see Section 3.1 – Functions), we can also extract requirement coverage
information from the generated test data.
5.1. Considerations on soundness and tool certification
In order to develop a sound model-based testing theory, typically, it is necessary to consider the following
elements: (i) adopt a formal specification language, (ii) assume that it is possible to represent the implemen-
tation behaviour using the same language (testability hypothesis), (iii) define an implementation relation
expressing correctness of implementations with respect to specification models, (iv) define a test generation
and a test execution procedure, and (v) finally prove that these procedures are sound with respect to the
implementation relation (i.e., if the execution of a generated test case fails, it means that the implementation
under test is not related to the considered specification model by the adopted implementation relation).
In this paper, we use Gallina as a formal specification language, and we use property-based testing
tool (QuickChick) to generate test data (input and expected output data). To develop a sound testing
theory, it would be necessary to define the missing elements, namely: an implementation relation, a test
execution procedure, besides taking into account the details on how QuickChick performs property-based
testing. Then, we would have the necessary ingredients to prove the soundness of this Gallina-based testing
theory. Regarding the implementation relation, a possible candidate would be a relation similar to the one
defined in [13]: csptio, a conformance relation for CSP timed input-output conformance relation, which also
addressed data-flow reactive systems.
9QuickChick manual: softwarefoundations.cis.upenn.edu/qc-current/
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Finally, in some critical domains, tool certification is mandatory prior to its integration into the devel-
opment process; unless the tool outputs are manually inspected, and evidence is produced in favor of the
correctness of them. In our work, we do not expect the integration of the NAT2TEST tool into a develop-
ment tool chain without manual inspection. Our goal is to aid the verification team by producing test data,
but it remains as the team responsibility the analyses of whether the system has been properly tested.
6. Empirical analyses
We evaluate our work by considering the VM and an example from the aerospace domain (provided by
Embraer): a priority command function (PC) that decides whether the pilot or copilot side stick will have
priority in controlling the airplane. Our evaluation considers performance and quality aspects. All data
presented here consider multiple executions. The main threat to validity is external. We cannot generalise
the conclusions, since few and not very complex examples were considered. Nevertheless, the results allow
interesting insights and provide feasibility evidence for our Coq characterisation and testing strategy.
We generated (multiple times) three datasets: performing 1, 5, and 10 calls to the QuickChick sampling
function. Each call performs 11 calls to genValidTrace. Therefore, each dataset contained 11, 55, and 110 test
cases, respectively. The size of each test is bounded to size = 100 (see Section 5) – up to 100 delay/function
transitions. The time to generate each dataset is small: VM (1.29s/0.01s; 3.75s/0.27s; 7.03s/0.63s) and
PC (1.37s/0.03s; 3.96/0.04s; 7.39s/0.80), µ /σ for each dataset10. The time is linearly proportional to the
number of sampling calls.
A mutant-based strength analysis was used to assess the quality of the generated tests. Mutation
operators yield a trustworthy comparison of test cases strength because they create erroneous programs in
a controlled and systematic way [22]. A good test suite should be able to detect the introduced error (kill
the mutant). Sometimes, the alive mutant is equivalent to the correct program. In general, this verification
is undecidable and too error-prone to be made manually.
We follow a conservative approach: all alive mutants are not equivalent ones. This assumption makes
the results of the empirical analyses the worst case. We considered C reference implementations, which were
mutated via SRCIROR [23]: 255/229 mutants were generated for the VM/PC, respectively. We wrote C
test drivers to run all mutants against all generated datasets. Figure 5 shows the mutation score (ratio of
killed/generated mutants) for the VM and PC.
In average, the mutation score was 75.80% (VM: µ = 74.56%/σ = 11.00%; PC: µ = 77.03%/σ = 2.81%).
For the VM, an outlier dataset killed all but one mutant. We inspected the alive one, and it is equivalent to
the original code. For the PC, it is worth noting that 5 and 10 calls to the sampling function yielded very
similar results. We believe these results are promising, considering the observed performance, besides being
fully automatic11. Higher scores should be pursued by complementing the dataset with specialist-defined
test scenarios.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents a logical and a functional characterisation of timed reactive systems in Coq, which
can be automatically derived from natural-language requirements. This allows for a single and consistent
framework for specifying, verifying, and testing such systems. Moreover, it contributes to the development
of correct-by-construction tools, since it is possible to extract Haskell or Ocaml code from the verified and
formal functional definitions. Furthermore, tests are automatically generated with the QuickChick tool.
Empirical analyses, considering examples both from the literature and the industry, showed that our testing
strategy is fast, and can detect about 75.80% defects introduced by mutation.
10Considering an i7 @ 2.40GHz x 4, with 8 GB of RAM running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
11All empirical data and scripts for the VM are available online: see Footnote 8. The files regarding the PC example cannot
be made publicly available.
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Figure 5: Mutant-based strength analysis
The integration of (interactive) theorem provers and testing strategies is a relevant research topic, and
thus has been developed by many researches. Similarly to Coq, other provers provide integration between
proofs and tests. For instance, considering the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL, we refer to [24, 25, 26].
In general, similar functionalities are provided among these different options. Modelling and/or testing
timed systems using (interactive) theorem provers is addressed, for example, in [27, 28, 29, 30], considering
timed connectors, real-time operating systems, programmable logic controllers, and Java code, respectively.
Differently, our work focus on models of system-level requirements. In this direction, we have the works
reported in [31, 32], which consider as modelling notation timed automata and Circus, respectively. However,
these models are not derived from natural-language requirements, which is the case here.
7.1. Future work
All proofs regarding the equivalence of logical and functional characterisations of DFRS models have been
completed. The generation of Coq specifications and test generation via QuickChick have been integrated
into the NAT2TEST tool. Furthermore, more empirical analyses have been carried out. These new results
will be fully presented and explained in the final version of this paper.
Besides these actions, which have already been carried out, we also plan to support specialist-defined
test scenarios. One will be able to define fragments of a test scenario, and, with the aid of QuickChick,
we will find a valid trace that includes the user-defined scenario. This will allow for complementing the
testing campaign with scenarios that need to be tested, which might not be necessarily covered by a random
test-generation strategy.
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